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1969]

SURVEY OF NEW YORK PRACTICE

demnity suit (i.e., one instituted before service of an answer) was
permitted in W. T. Grant Co. v. Uneeda Doll Co.8s by the first department where the main suit was instituted in Connecticut, presumably
because the New York courts could not exercise control over that
litigation. 2
Apparently in the absence of the "jurisdictional problem" pre83
sented in a case such as Grant, the courts will not permit such suits.
Thus, in Lasker-Goldman Corp. v. Delma Engineering Corp.,8 4 the

first department recently reversed an order granting plaintiff partial
summary judgment on a cause of action based upon an indemnity
clause. The clause was unambiguous as to defendant's potential liability, but third party complainants had done no more than file claims
for damages at the time judgment was rendered. The plaintiff was

therefore clearly not yet entitled to recovery and the denial of the
motion for summary judgment was proper.
ARTICLE

31 -D ISCLOSURE

CPLR 3101(d): Second department adopts liberal view with regard to
disclosure of witnesses' names.
In Peretz v. Blekicki,8 5 the second department gave appellate
affirmation to the policy, recently promulgated by a supreme court
in that department,"8 of liberal disclosure of a witness' name.
In modifying the lower court decision to allow the disclosure of
the identity of a witness to an accident, unless it appears that such
matter is otherwise privileged under CPLR 3101(c) or (d), the appellate
division relied upon both Hartley v. Ring8 7 and Allen v. Crowell-Collier Publishing Co.88 In Allen, the Court of Appeals promulgated a

test of "usefulness and reason" which should be liberally construed so
as to require pre-trial disclosure of a witness' name.
The importance of Peretz lies in the fact that it puts the weight

of the appellate division behind the pronouncement previously issued
81 19 App. Div. 2d 361, 243 N.Y.S.2d 428 (Ist Dep't 1963).
82 See 7B McKINNEY'S CPLR 3014, supp. commentary 117, 118 (1968).
83 See Lasker-Goldman Corp. v. Delma Eng'r Corp., 32 App. Div. 2d 513, 298 N.Y.S.2d

747 (Ist Dep't 1969); Morey v. Sealright Co., 41 Misc. 2d 1068, 1070, 247 N.Y.S.2d 306, 308-09
(Sup. Ct. Onondaga County 1964).
84 52 App. Div. 2d 513, 298 N.Y.S.2d 747 (Ist Dep't 1969).
85 31 App. Div. 2d 934, 298 N.Y.S.2d 805 (2d Dep't 1969).
86 See Hartley v. Ring, 58 Misc. 2d 618, 296 N.Y.S.2d 394 (Sup. Ct. Queens County
1969). See also The Quarterly Survey of New York Practice,44 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 135, 140

(1969) for an analysis of the history leading to this decision.
8758 Misc. 2d 618, 296 N.Y.S.2d 394 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1969).
88 21 N.Y.2d 403, 235 N.E.2d 430, 288 N.Y.S.2d 449 (1968). See also The Quarterly
Survey of New York Practice,43 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 302, 324-25 (1968).
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in Hartley. Thus, the ability of a party to "hide" the name of a witness,
which was ended in theory by Allen, is also being terminated by the
lower courts in practice.
ARTICLE 32 -ACCELERATED

JUDGMENT

CPLR 3212: Dobkin "real party in interest doctrine" not extended to
motion for summary judgment.
In Kopperman v. Zar,8 9 plaintiff was injured while riding as a passenger in one co-defendant's vehicle when it struck the rear of the other
co-defendant's vehicle. Both defendants were insured by the same liability carrier, and there was no question but that the accident was
caused by the negligence of either or both defendants. Since she clearly
was not contributorily negligent, the plaintiff, relying upon Dobkin
v. Chapman,00 sought summary judgment against the insurer on the
grounds that it was the "real party in interest."
The "real party in interest issue" arose in Dobkin when the defendants moved to set aside service because of an alleged denial of due
process. Defendants could not be located for service after they had
become involved in an automobile accident in New York, and the
Court upheld service whereby the summons and complaint were mailed
to defendant's last known address in New York and a copy thereof was
delivered to defendant's insurance carrier- the real party in interest.
The ratio decidendi of Dobkin is that the requirements of due process
have been met if defendant has been given reasonable notice. And the
question of reasonableness depends upon a balancing of interests after
consideration is given to all the attendant circumstances.0 1 Accordingly,
it noted that in view of "the plaintiff's need, the public interest, the
reasonableness of the plaintiff's efforts under all the cricumstances to
inform the defendant, and the availability of other safeguards for the
defendant's interest," 92 service in Dobkin was reasonable, whereas the
same manner of service in another case might fail to meet the requirements of due process.
It is readily apparent from the tone of the Kopperman opinion
that the "real party in interest" theory may well be limited and restricted to those situations in which a plaintiff would otherwise be unable
to serve the proper defendant. The court suggests three problems which
89 59 Misc. 2d 102, 298 N.Y.S.2d 150 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. Queens County 1969).
90 21 N.Y.2d 490, 236 N.E.2d 451, 289 N.Y.S.2d 161 (1968). Dobkin is a consolidation
of three cases. See The Quarterly Survey of New York Practice, 43 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 302,
310 (1968). See also 7B MCKINNEY'S CPLR 308, supp. commentary 167 (1968).
91 7B MCKINNEY'S CPLR 808, supp. commentary 167 (1968).
92 21 N.Y.2d at 503, 236 N.E.2d at 458, 289 N.Y.S.2d at 172.

